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Abstract: Scientists and policymakers are increasingly aware that wildﬁre management
eﬀorts should be broadened beyond the century-long emphasis on suppression to include more
eﬀective eﬀorts at fuel management. Because wildﬁre risks change over time as vegetation
matures, fuel management can be viewed as a timing problem, much like timber harvest
itself. We develop a nested rotation model to examine the fuel treatment timing issue
in the context of a forest environment with both timber value and non-timber values-at-
risk. Simulations are performed for a ponderosa pine forest and discussed with a focus on
three important aspects of wildﬁre management: 1) the economic tradeoﬀs between fuel
treatments, suppression, and timber harvest 2) the eﬀects of public wildﬁre suppression on
private fuel management incentives, 3) externality problems when non-timber values-at-risk
such as wildland-urban interface property is not accounted for in private fuel management
decisions.
1 Introduction
A century-long policy of intensive wildﬁre suppression has contributed to substantial accumu-
lation of vegetative fuel loads and wildﬁres of increasing severity in many forest environments
(Ingalsbee 2000, Prestemon et al. 2001). Over the last three decades, forest managers and
ﬁre researchers have increasingly called for greater emphasis on management of vegetative
fuels for wildﬁre risk mitigation (Stephens 1998, Pollet and Omi 2002, Hof and Omi 2003,
Rideout 2003, Martinson and Omi 2003). In response, the Healthy Forests Restoration Act
of 2003 (HFRA) includes substantial emphasis on fuels management to address forest health
and wildﬁre concerns. In principle, the Act calls for increases in the use of prescribed ﬁre and
mechanical thinning to reduce fuel loads, and it dictates that these eﬀorts should concentrate
1primarily on the wildland urban interface. The precursor to the HFRA, George W. Bush’s
Healthy Forest Initiative, sparked oﬀ heated debate because environmental groups argued
that it was an attempt to justify and facilitate commercial logging on federal land.
One of the major hurdles for addressing the controversy over the Healthy Forest Initiative
is a poor scientiﬁc understanding of the eﬀectiveness of fuel management for wildﬁre risk
mitigation and of the economic and physical relationships between fuel management and
suppression as wildﬁre risk mitigation alternatives. The theoretical economic foundations of
wildﬁre suppression were initially developed early in the twentieth century as a simple cost
minimization problem (Sparhawk 1925), and this cost-minimization perspective has been
incorporated conceptually into the decision-making process of wildﬁre suppression eﬀorts.
However, the empirical understanding of the productivity of suppression for reducing damage
is weak to nonexistent. The scientiﬁc understanding of fuel management for wildﬁre risk
mitigation is also still at an early stage of development, especially research regarding political
economy, property rights, and incentives for fuel management (Hesseln 2000). The relative
eﬀectiveness of commercial logging as a means of mitigating wildﬁre risk is unclear, especially
in comparison to prescribed ﬁre and pre-commercial thinning as alternatives (Carey and
Schumann 2003, Sparhawk 1925, Stone et al. 2004). Finally, the economic relationship of
fuel management and suppression as complements is only just now beginning to receive
signiﬁcant attention in the economics literature (Botti et al. 2004, Omi 2004, Prestemon
et al. 2004).
We contribute to this nascent literature on the economic relationship between suppression
and fuel management by developing a dynamic model and simulations to characterize and
illustrate the fundamental tradeoﬀs involved in wildﬁre risk mitigation. We model fuel
management as a timing problem in which fuel treatment rotations are nested within a timber
harvest rotation. Wildﬁre occurrence is a stochastic variable whose probability distribution
is altered by fuel treatment and truncated by harvest. The costs of wildﬁre include timber
and non-timber property damage, as well as wildﬁre suppression costs. Choice variables
2in the model include the number and timing of fuel treatments, the timber harvest date,
and wildﬁre suppression eﬀort. We parameterize the general model and perform simulations
for a representative ponderosa pine forest, a prevalent forest type in the Western United
States in low elevation areas that are often populated by humans. The model allows a
formal representation of the economic tradeoﬀs between wildﬁre damage and suppression,
fuel treatment, and harvest, as well as analytical and numerical comparative statics analysis
for changes in various model parameters, such as exogenous increases in values at risk,
suppression costs, and fuel treatment costs.
We apply the model to examine some important institutional issues for private and
public landowners and managers in wildﬁre prone environments. First, individual private
landowners face relatively weak incentives for fuel management and suppression because they
do not accrue all the beneﬁts of these eﬀorts; some accrue to neighbors in the region because
wildﬁre moves through a landscape regardless of property boundaries. This externality
problem is particularly acute in highly fragmented and high value areas such as at the
wildland urban interface. Second, because wildﬁre suppression is generally provided by public
agencies, the full cost of wildﬁre are not accrued by landowners and are not economically
tied to fuel management activities. Public land managers also arguably face incentives that
induce too much investment in suppression and too little in fuel management (Ingalsbee
2000, O’Toole 2002).
Numerous studies have focused on the economics of timber harvest under the risk of
total destruction of forest value based on Faustmann-type analyses (Martell 1980, Routledge
1980, Reed 1984, Reed and Errico 1985 1986, Reed 1987, Thorsen and Helles 1998). Of
these, our approach is perhaps most closely related to Reed (1987), which uses an optimal
control framework to examine optimal timber rotation and continuous wildﬁre protection
for a forest stand subject to sudden destruction by ﬁre. Along diﬀerent lines, Yoder (2004)
examines the optimal rotation of prescribed ﬁre treatments for reducing wildﬁre risk and
providing forage or other beneﬁts. Our approach is unique in three ways: First, we present a
3model general enough to make use of the two general forms of fuel treatment (thinning and
prescribed ﬁre). Second, although the treatment of fuel management as a rotation problem is
similar in spirit to Yoder (2004), the analytical and numerical implementation of the nested
rotation problem is substantially diﬀerent and provides new insights into the relationships
between treatments, harvest, and suppression. Third, we formally examine the impacts of
externalities and public ﬁreﬁghting suppression on private fuel management incentives.
The next section describes the theoretical model and optimization routine. In section
three the results of the simulations are presented and discussed, followed in section four
concludes with some policy implications.
2 Wildﬁre Management as a Nested Rotation Problem
Consider a forest stand that is managed to maximize the expected net present value of an
inﬁnite series of harvests under the risk of wildﬁre. At any point in time during the matura-
tion of the forest stand, a wildﬁre might occur that can impose damage on both the forest
stand and other property such as homes. The time-path of wildﬁre risk (referred to as the
wildﬁre return distribution in the ﬁre sciences literature), is aﬀected by fuel management
interventions, and in the event of a pre-harvest wildﬁre, the extent of damage can be re-
duced by suppression eﬀort. Thus, control variables include the number and timing of fuel
management interventions, suppression eﬀort in the event of a wildﬁre, and a timber harvest
date.
Suppose that the timber rotation can be ended in one of two ways: by harvest, or by
a wildﬁre, after which a salvage harvest is performed followed by replanting. Following
Reed (1984), The duration of a rotation can then be thought of as a random variable whose
distribution censored at the planned harvest date. This wildﬁre return distribution is aﬀected
by intra-harvest fuel management interventions. Let Tn = [T1,T2,...,Tn]0 be a n × 1 vector
of planned action dates. The last element, Tn, is the planned harvest date, and the previous
4elements Ti for i < n are fuel management intervention dates. Every fuel management
intervention Ti has the eﬀect of setting the fuel load back to an initial state, thus shifting the
ﬁre return distribution out by the amount of time since the last ﬁre or intervention. Figure 1
illustrates the probability density function and cumulative density function for wildﬁres with
and without fuel management interventions Below we develop the wildﬁre return distribution
conditional on fuel management interventions.
Let the “natural” wildﬁre return density function (as if it were uninterrupted by manage-
ment interventions or harvest) be denoted f(x), which satisﬁes the requirements of a prob-
ability density function for x ∈ <+: f(x) ≥ 0 ∀ x > 0 and
R ∞
0 f(x)dx = 1. The associated
cumulative distribution function for wildﬁre occurrence in the absence of fuel management
or harvest is F(x), so that F(Ti) = Prob[x < Ti]. Let S(Ti) = Prob[x ≥ Ti] = [1 − F(Ti)]
denote the survival function evaluated at intervention i, which equals the probability of ap-
plying intervention i of n prior to a wildﬁre event.1 The probability of a wildﬁre occurring

















f(x − Tn−1)dx = S(Tn−1)F(Tn − Tn−1). (1)
where the vector Ti =

T1 T2 ··· Ti

(in boldface) represents the dates of all interventions
up to the ith and Ti (no boldface) represent the date of ith intervention. The wildﬁre return
distribution is censored at Tn, and the probability of reaching harvest without a wildﬁre is
1The following framework follows the engineering literature on reliability and maintenance. See Kececioglu
(1991) for an example of a more general treatment.
5S(Tn) = 1 − F(Tn).
The expected net present value of a timber rotation is made up of two primary compo-
nents:
• The costs of fuel management interventions prior to harvest or wildﬁre.
• The net beneﬁts accrued at the end of the rotation, which may be ended by wildﬁre
or harvest.
The cost of a fuel treatment w is accrued at the time of each respective intervention, but a
treatment will be performed only if a wildﬁre has not occurred prior to the planned treatment
date, and only if one or more fuel treatments is optimal (that is, if n > 1 is chosen). Given
that an intervention i is carried out, the discounted cost is e−rTiw, and the probability
carrying out the intervention is S(Ti). The discounted expected value of intervention costs










where In>1 is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if n > 1 and zero otherwise.
Now consider the beneﬁts and costs that are accrued at the end of the rotation, which
we will denote Y . Because the ﬁre return distribution is censored at Tn, the expected net
present value of Y can be written concisely as
E[Y ] = E[Y |x < Tn] + E[Y |x = Tn]. (3)
Let the function V (t) denote the stumpage value of timber at any point in time since the
end of the last rotation. For simplicity we assume that the stumpage value depends only on
stand age (so that fuel treatments do not aﬀect the growth or quality of standing timber),
and we ignore replanting costs.2 If the harvest date Tn is reached without a wildﬁre event
2Both of these simpliﬁcations are easily incorporated into the model, but clutter analytical results and
are not of central interest in this paper.
6(x = Tn), the full value of timber V (Tn) is recovered at harvest. Thus, the expected value
from harvest at the planned date (the second element in equation 3) is
E[Y |x = Tn] = e
−rTnV (Tn) × Prob[x = Tn] = e
−rTnV (Tn)S(Tn). (4)
If a wildﬁre occurs prior to the planned harvest date (x < Tn), suppression eﬀort s is exerted
to reduce the fraction of value lost to the ﬁre, and a salvage harvest for the remaining
timber value is performed immediately.3 Let suppression eﬀort be denoted s with marginal
cost τ. In the event of a wildﬁre, the fraction g(s)V (x) is lost, so the remaining value is
(1−g(s))V (x). The function g(s) can be thought of as a suppression productivity function,
with ﬁrst and second derivatives g0(s) < 0 and g00(s) > 0.
Non-timber values can be very important in the context of wildﬁre management, espe-
cially in the Wildland Urban Interface. For expediency in simulating the consequences of
externalities on risk mitigation decisions, we treat non-timber damage as distinct from tim-
ber losses. Let D represent non-timber values-at-risk from a wildﬁre, such that D is the
total replacement value of non-timber property that would be lost given a wildﬁre and no
suppression eﬀort (s = 0). We assume that suppression productivity is the same for both
timber and non-timber values, so that total property losses for a given suppression level are
g(s)(V (t)+D). We also assume that the non-timber property is replaced immediately after
the ﬁre. Putting the above elements together, the net value accrued if and when a wildﬁre
occurs before harvest is
h(x,s) = V (x) − g(s)(V (x) + D) − τs. (5)
3There are other possible ways to model timber value loss and the timing of timber value accruals. If the
ﬁre damage is not uniform, such as if it completely destroys one part of the stand but leaves the remaining
fraction unharmed, the manager may leave the remaining timber to grow until the planned timber harvest
date V (Tn). A complication with this scenario in the context of numerous timber rotations is that each time
a ﬁre occurs, the initial stand is eﬀectively split by the ﬁre into two stands of separate ages. Over the course
of many rotations and many ﬁres, the stand could be atomized into many small stands of various ages.
7Given an interest rate of r, the expected net present value of the rotation at the end of each
successive stage Ti is









−r(x+T1) hx(x,s) f(x − T1)dx




−r(x+T2) hx(x,s) f(x − T2)dx
. . .




−r(x+Tn−1) hx(x,s) f(x − Tn−1)dx. (6)
and letting T0 = 0,
E[Y |x < Tn] =
n X
i=1
E[Y |Ti−1 < x < Ti] (7)
where hx(x,s) = ∂h/∂x = (1 − g(s))Vx represents the change in h(x,s) over time, which
amounts to the growth rate of the value of undamaged timber for a given s. Equation 7
is the ﬁrst term in equation 3. The expected net present value of a single rotation equals
equation 3 minus equation 2. Following Reed (1984), Englin et al. (2000) and others, the
expected net present value of an inﬁnite series of rotations is
E[NPV] =
E[Y ] − E[C]
1 − E[e−rTn]
(8)














where S(Ti) are deﬁned in equation 1 and S(T0) = 1. The expectation on the discount
factor for the series of inﬁnite rotations is necessary because the rotation length itself is a
random variable.
8Given the necessary and suﬃcient curvature conditions in the economic region of the
choice set, maximization of objective function (8) requires jointly maximizing over n choice
variable, with n − 1 pre-harvest fuel management interventions, harvest (the nth action),
and the expected suppression eﬀort. Because the number of choice variables is endogenous,
solving the optimization problem is performed with a two step process: 1) conditional op-
timization for a set of feasible n, and then 2) selecting the n× 1 vector that provides the
highest expected net present value.
2.1 Selected analytical results
For illustration, consider the ﬁrst-order conditions for the case of n = 2. The landowner




, and the expected suppression eﬀort s
corresponding to n = 2. We begin by characterizing the analytical ﬁrst-order conditions for
the case in which the timber owner faces all costs and beneﬁts. We then brieﬂy discuss two
extensions of the model: 1) the case in which some wildﬁre damage is external to the timber
owner’s decision process, and 2) the case in which suppression is provided by a public agency
rather than the timber owner.
For clarity and intuition of the following analytical results, we temporarily assume a
planning horizon of just one timber harvest rotation. The results are intuitively similar for
an inﬁnite series of timber harvests, but the analytical ﬁrst-order conditions are complicated
by elements that amount to Faustmann-like land rent components.4 This assumption is
dropped later (the simulations are based on an inﬁnite set of timber harvest rotations).





∂E[Y |0 ≤ x < T1]
∂z
+
∂E[Y |T1 ≤ x < T2]
∂z
+






4The analytical results for an inﬁnite series of timber rotations are available from the authors.








−r(t+T1)f(t − T1) hs(t,s) dt = 0,
which is satisﬁed if
hs(t,s) ≡ −gs[V (t) + D] − τ = 0. (11)
This ﬁrst-order condition implies that the marginal beneﬁt of suppression in terms of damage
foregone equals the marginal cost of suppression whenever a wildﬁre occurs.5
The ﬁrst-order condition for fuel management is slightly more complex. Assuming (as
we do in the simulations below) that a fuel management intervention restores the wildﬁre





0(T1) − rS(T1))f(t − T1) − S(T1)f
0(t − T1)]dt
− e
−rT1 [hT1(T1,s) + w(rS(T1) − S
0(T1))] = 0. (12)
The ﬁrst line of equation 12 corresponds to the marginal net gains from shortening the time
between the fuel treatment and harvest. The second line corresponds to the marginal gains
from extending the time until the ﬁrst fuel intervention, which includes the present value of
the change in the probability of expending w, and the marginal gains in h(t,s) prior to T1.
Finally, harvest is performed when the expected marginal increase in timber value from
further growth equals the total expected marginal cost of waiting. Assuming again that the






0(T2) + V (T2)(ST2(T1,T2) − r)]} = 0 (13)
The ﬁrst element in braces is the marginal net present expected beneﬁt of delaying harvest
5This ﬁrst-order condition is the same for an inﬁnite series of rotations as well.
10corresponding to the case in which an intervening wildﬁre occurs (∂E[Y |T1 < x < T2]/∂T2).
The second element in braces is the marginal expected beneﬁts corresponding to harvest
prior to a wildﬁre event (∂E[Y |x = T2]/∂T2).
2.2 Extensions: fuel-related externalities and public suppression
Two important aspects of the fuel management problem is that timber owners or managers
often do not face the full costs of their contributions to wildﬁre risk to neighboring prop-
erty, nor do they pay the full price of suppressing wildﬁres to which their vegetation has
contributed, because ﬁre suppression services are generally provided for and funded through
public agencies.
Non-timber damage as an externality. To consider the eﬀects of external wildﬁre
damage, we choose a simple alternative for simulation comparisons that can be a reasonable
representation of the wildland-urban interface. Suppose that the timber owner faces all of
the timber losses associated with wildﬁre, but none of the non-timber values at risk, such
that D might represent the value of homes in nearby wooded residential neighborhoods.
Then the timber owner will make decisions about fuel management, harvest and perhaps
suppression (if he or she were paying for it) as if D were equal to zero, even if it is not.
Resource allocation decisions for this liability structure can then be compared to the case
where the landowner is liable for all costs, including nonzero D.
Public rather than private suppression. The second case, where timber owners do
not pay for suppression, can be examined by making two modiﬁcations to the forest owner’s
optimization problem. First, the suppression cost term τ s must be removed from h(x,s)
(equation 5), because the timber owner no longer pays these costs. Second, the landowner
makes fuel management decisions based on the expectation that suppression will be publicly
provided if a ﬁre occurs. We account for this expectation by assuming that in the event
of a ﬁre, public suppression will be provided at an optimal level such that it satisﬁes ﬁrst-
11order condition (11), conditional on the forest owner’s pre-ﬁre private fuel management
decisions. This ﬁrst order condition is therefore added as a constraint to the timber owner’s
optimization, which, again, is represented by equation (8) but with τ s removed from the
second line. Thus, public suppression levels are second-best in the sense that it is optimal
given preexisting (suboptimal) fuel management outcomes by forest owners. It should be
noted that it is highly unlikely that wildﬁre suppression activities satisfy ﬁrst-order condition
(11). They have almost unlimited but non-reallocable budgets for suppression, which would
likely lead to over-suppression (O’Toole 2002). There are a number of other incentive issues
lurking within this problem as well, but we use ﬁrst-order condition (11) as the constraint
as a simple illustrative assumption.
3 Simulations speciﬁcation and results
For simulation, we parameterize our model to approximate ponderosa pine forest of the
inland northwest region. We choose a ponderosa pine environment both because it is a
common ﬁre-prone environment with substantial human populations (Pollet and Omi 2002),
and because there is relatively more known about ponderosa pine ﬁre ecology compared to
most other forest types. The speciﬁcation is based on a per acre basis, but it is important to
recognize that the structure and speciﬁcation of any fuel management and wildﬁre system
such as this is likely to be highly dependent on stand size.
To represent the growth in value of ponderosa pine timber, we use the modiﬁed Weibull
function V (t) = A(1 − e−α tβ) described in Yang et al. (1978), where the coeﬃcient A
represents the stumpage value of the timber. Using a set of data collected by the Paciﬁc
Southwest Research Station and published in Oliver and Powers (1978), we estimated the
growth function V (t) = 128000(1−e−0.0005t2), given a site index 80 and a spacing of 10 feet.
For the ﬁre return interval representing wildﬁre probabilities, we use a Weibull distribution
with location, scale, and shape parameters of a = 0.001, b = 30, c = 2, respectively, which
12is generally consistent with estimated historic ﬁre return intervals for this forest type. (see
Smith and Fischer (1997) for further discussion). These parameters result in a probability
density function of f(t) = 0.002te−0.001t2and a cumulative distribution function of F(t) =
1 − e−0.001t2. The mean ﬁre return interval for this distribution is approximately 26.6 years.
The productivity of suppression is deﬁned in terms of the fraction of potential damage
saved. Based on preliminary regressions using the National Interagency Fire Information
Database NIFMID (2004) and simulation model calibration, we use a suppression production
function g(s) = e−0.5s, where suppression eﬀort s is deﬁned such that the ﬁre suppression
costs per acre is τ = 295 (Schuster et al. 1997). Accordingly, the per acre cost of one fuel
treatment intervention is set at $130 for U.S. Forest Service region 5, which corresponds
to the area where the data were collected (see Schuster et al. (1997) for further discussion).
Finally, the interest rate r is set at 0.05, and non-timber values at risk are set to D =100,000.
The numerical results for six management strategies are shown in Table 1. The simula-
tions were performed using the software Mathematica (Wolfram Research 2002). For each
case, the timing and number of interventions, the expected level of suppression given a wild-
ﬁre, the harvest date, and expected net present values to both the timber owner and to
society as a whole are shown. The diﬀerence between the timber owner’s present value of
expected net beneﬁts and society’s is the expected net present value of total external costs.
Cases 1 through 4 are based on the assumption that the timber owner pays for suppression
as if it were a part of operating expenses. Cases 4 and 5 assume publicly provided suppression
as discussed above. Cases 2 through 4 and 6 show the eﬀects of restricting the use of one
or more management alternative to zero. For each case, two sub-cases are shown: one in
which the timber owner pays for non-timber damage, D, and one in which he or she does
not. This comparison is important, because apart from some special cases, landowners are
not generally liable for wildﬁres that move oﬀ their land onto the land of others.
A couple of general characteristics of the results in table 1 are worth noting. First, in
all cases, fuel intervention intervals shorten over time within the harvest interval because
13the value of timber is growing and therefore the values at risk are higher later in the timber
rotation. Second, it should be no surprise that the timber owner’s private net present
expected value is higher when he or she is not responsible for either non-timber value D or
suppression costs, but the social net present expected value is lower due to the poor private
timing of actions. Finally, the rotation lengths vary, but are not inconsistent with ponderosa
pine rotations in similar environments (Fiedler et al. 1988)
3.1 Private suppression
In Case 1, all management options are performed, and suppression costs are borne directly
by the timber owner. The results in table 1 show that the expected net present value of the
objective function is maximized with the application of 6 fuel management interventions.
When the timber owner is liable for all costs including D, the harvest date is 43.7 years;
expected suppression is 87.2 units, and the value of private and social net beneﬁt is $9,223.
Intervals between fuel interventions are shorter when the timber owner is liable for all po-
tential damage. For case 1 with landowner liable for D, the expected time of a wildﬁre given
the optimal intervention dates is E[x] = 42.8 < T7.
For case 1 given that the owner is not responsible for non-timber losses D, the harvest
date is later 45.0 years. The probability of reaching harvest without a wildﬁre in this case
is S(T5) = 0.93, whereas the probability of reaching t = 45 without fuel treatments is 0.81.
Expected suppression eﬀort of 6.13 is substantially lower because we are assuming private
suppression eﬀort for this case. Thus, as would be expected, when D is not accounted for
privately, fuel management is delayed and suppression eﬀort is reduced. Further, the timber
owner’s net beneﬁt is higher than ($9,325) than when D is internalized, but the net social
value of the timber rotations is lower.
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the number of fuel treatment and optimal sup-
pression eﬀort (with optimal intervention timing conditional the number of treatments) for
case 1 without landowner liable for D. As the number of treatments increases to n − 1 = 4,
14expected optimal suppression eﬀort decreases. After n − 1 = 4, expected suppression eﬀort
increases. Two things are happening here: 1) each additional treatment shifts the expected
date of a wildﬁre out, and 2) the optimal harvest date shifts out, leading to larger values at
risk because V (t) is growing. Going from n−1 = 4 to n−1 = 5, the (diminishing) marginal
value of a treatment in terms of risk reduction is more than oﬀset by the higher marginal
value product of suppression due to growth in V (t), so higher suppression expenditures
compensates for diminishing returns of fuel treatments.
Case 2 restricts suppression to equal zero and is included in table 1 for comparison with
case 1. Here, the number and timing of the fuel management interventions and the harvest
date are the only means of addressing wildﬁre risk. Compared to Case 1, fuel management
and harvest dates are earlier, and when the timber owner is not liable for D, the number
of fuel management interventions is higher by one compared to the case 1 analogue. Thus,
earlier fuel treatments (and perhaps more of them), and earlier harvest, act as substitutes
for suppression. Note also that both private and social net beneﬁts are lower than in their
comparable case 1 results.
In case 3, no fuels management regime is implemented, so suppression and timber harvest
timing alone are relied upon as choice variables. Loosely speaking, this case might represent
the general approach followed by the U.S. forest service throughout most of the 20th century.
Timber harvest dates are 31.9 and 33.3 years when liable and not liable for D, respectively.
In each case, timber rotation lengths decrease approximately 8 years compared to case 1.
Suppression levels are lower than case 1 (25.6 and 4.7 when liable for D or not, respectively).
Thus, most of the eﬀect of ignoring fuel treatments as an option is accounted for by reductions
in harvest dates, and given that harvest rotations are short, timber-values at risk are lower
at the expected wildﬁre date, and so the marginal value product function of suppression is
lower, so less suppression is used.
Case 4 assumes both fuel management and suppression are restricted to be zero, so the
timber harvest date is the only choice variable. As one might expect, harvests dates are the
15shortest of all cases, occurring at 26.3 and 30.2 years with and without timber-owner liability
for non-timber values, respectively.
It is of particular interest to note that of all management regimes so far, those in which fuel
management is restricted provide the lowest expected net present value (cases 3 and 4, liable
for D) both to the forest owner and to society. This result is supportive of the increasingly
fervent calls for the importance of fuels management in ﬁre-prone environments.
3.2 Public suppression
Cases 5 and 6 are based on the assumption that in the event of a wildﬁre, a public agency
applies suppression optimally, given private fuel accumulations up until the date of the
ﬁre. Therefore, “optimal” suppression in this case is second-best in the sense that private
fuel management will be ineﬃcient because timber owners are not bearing the suppression
component of the costs of wildﬁre, and will therefore alter their fuel management regimes
relative to case 1 (the eﬃcient case).
Case 5 shows the result with publicly provided suppression and private fuel management.
The simulation shows that public suppression of 89.6 and 91.9 units (with and without
landowner liability for D, respectively) is higher than any case in which suppression costs
are borne by the timber owner. When the timber owner does not account for non-timber
damage, the harvest date of 46.2 years and net private beneﬁt of $9,351 are the highest of
all scenarios. The number of fuel interventions is reduced to 2, and the lengths of intervals
between them increases.
With public suppression and no fuel management, as in case 6, harvest dates are again
shorter, but public suppression is at its highest of all (99.9 and 105.5). Given the assumption
that harvest and fuel treatments mitigate ﬁre risk, and regardless of potential non-timber
losses internalization, this case provides lower social beneﬁts ($7,604 and $7,570) compared
to case 5, where fuel treatments are applied.
Of all the cases presented, these last two scenarios with public suppression and no liability
16for potential non-timber damage are perhaps the most similar to the incentives of private
landowners in most of the United States. Weak incentives to invest in wildﬁre prevention
through fuel management and long harvest rotations lead to very high public suppression
expenditures. These results are consistent with the increasing suppression costs and wildﬁre
severity observed over the past decades. In eﬀect, since ﬁre suppression expenditures are
supported almost entirely by public agencies, there is little private incentive to invest in
preventive actions such as fuel treatments. This ultimately lead to more catastrophic ﬁres
and to increasing public ﬁreﬁghting expenditures.
Although the above simulations provide insights into the trade-oﬀs between suppression
and fuel treatments that cover a broad range of wildﬁre issues, they are based on just one set
of underlying physical relationships between timber growth, wildﬁre risk, fuel management,
harvest, costs, and beneﬁts. There are many ways in which the model could be respeciﬁed to
better ﬁt a given situation. For example, we have applied the same suppression productivity
function to timber and non-timber values, but it is likely that approaches to protecting
homes are diﬀerent than approaches to protecting timber, implying that the suppression
productivity function would diﬀer. We have also assumed that the timber stumpage value is
not a function of the treatments’ timing, when in fact it is likely that thinning and prescribed
ﬁre activities also often augment timber growth. Finally, the optimistic assumption of second-
best public ﬁreﬁghting eﬀort almost certainly grossly underestimates the level of suppression
eﬀort exerted by ﬁreﬁghting agencies.
4 Policy and Management implications
Wildﬁre fuels and values at risk change over time, so wildﬁre risk management is in part a
timing problem. In this article, we embed the wildﬁre management problem in a setting that
captures many of the important elements aﬀecting incentives for private and public wildﬁre
risk mitigation, and many of the most pressing policy questions as well.
17Fuel management provides positive externalities to the extent that it reduces the contri-
bution of a landholding to regional wildﬁre risk. Although there are good reasons for public
provision of wildﬁre suppression services, one consequence of public ﬁreﬁghting services is
that the private marginal costs of waiting to invest in fuel management are not fully in-
ternalized by the landowner or forest manager. The result of these two incentive problems
is “too little, too late” private fuel management, and public suppression expenditures that
are substantially higher than they might otherwise be. A century of this combination of
incentives may be a major contributor to the apparent substantial increases in suppression
costs and wildﬁre severity in recent years.
The legal and regulatory environment frames private incentives for fuel management.
There is a small but growing number of public programs and laws pertaining to wildﬁre fuel
management that arguably tries to address the incentive problems illustrated in this paper.
A few states have cost-share programs for fuel reduction on private land, and laws have been
proposed in several state legislatures to direct the funding needs for suppression at forest
owners speciﬁcally. As these laws develop, it is important that they be designed to aﬀect
fuel management choices at the margin for individual forest owners.
One interesting legal conundrum relates to prescribed ﬁre, which is often the least-cost
method of wildﬁre as a fuel management option.6 Although legal liability for prescribed
ﬁre use is relatively clearly established in statutory and common law, legal liability for
accumulation of excessive fuel loads is notYoder et al. (2003). If a wildﬁre starts or ﬂows
through a landholding, the landowner is usually not at risk of liability for excessive fuel
loads.7 But if a prescribed ﬁre started for fuel management purposes escapes and turns into
a wildﬁre, the person performing the prescribed ﬁre faces relatively well-developed negligence
law Yoder et al. (2003). Thus, although the full expected costs of prescribed ﬁre may be
6On the wildland-urban interface, it is also important to balance the incentives of forest owners with the
incentives of homeowners. “Moving to the hazard” and homeowner incentives are an important element of
this problem, but because the focus of this paper focuses on timber owners speciﬁcally, we leave these issues
aside.
7A few states do have statutory negligence laws for individuals who do not attempt to stop a ﬁre from
spreading from their land.
18approximately accounted for, the costs of leaving the fuel alone may not.8
The relationship between wildﬁre and timber harvest is also a contentious issue. George
W. Bush’s precursor to the Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003, The Healthy Forest
Initiative, discusses fuel management at length, but environmentalists attacked the initiative
as a politically motivated attempt to open the door for increased timber harvest.
Furthermore, many ﬁre ecologists claim that timber harvest, particularly old growth, is
usually not an eﬀective means of reducing wildﬁre risk. The structure of our model elucidates
a couple of dimensions of this issue. First, the type of property at risk matters. If timber
values are at risk, it makes sense to harvest earlier in areas with high wildﬁre risk, preempting
wildﬁre losses by extracting value. For non-timber values, altering timber harvest timing is
a form of fuel management for wildﬁre risk reduction. If timber harvest is ineﬀective at
reducing wildﬁre risk to non-timber values, then shortening timber harvests makes little
economic sense in terms of reducing non-timber losses.9 On the other hand, if harvest does
reduce the risk of nontimber damage, then shorter rotations make economic sense. This
last point is illustrated by the harvest date diﬀerences between the scenarios in which the
timber owner is responsible for non-timber values and those in which the timber owner is
not responsible for nontimber values.
As is the case with much of the recent wildﬁre management literature, the emphasis
of the Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003 is on the spatial distribution of wildﬁre
risk mitigation, with explicit directives to focus spatially on the wildland-urban interface.
Nonetheless, the fuel management is a dynamic temporal problem as well. Although the
model presented in this paper is modelled as a single ﬁre-prone forest stand, a useful further
development would be to incorporate the dynamic model into a broader spatially explicit
8In four states, however, landowners or contractors can be found liable for activity fuels such as timber
slash, where a speciﬁc activity, such as timber harvest, can lead to substantially increased wildﬁre risk.
The characteristic of being able to pinpoint a speciﬁc action (e.g. the creation of timber slash) is helpful
for clearly assigning liability and negligence through the courts; at the margin, it is likely more diﬃcult to
pinpoint a threshold of negligence with respect to natural fuel accumulation.
9In simulations examined in this article we assume that both harvest and wildﬁre interventions reduce
wildﬁre risk to zero, but the model can easily be speciﬁed to diﬀerentiate between the two activities and
allow for incomplete risk reduction in either case.
19model of wildﬁre risk management.
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4 42.7 45.0 6.13 9,325 9,201










5 40.8 44.6 9,239 7,290
Case 3: Private Yes 31.9 25.6 7,711 7,711
suppression only No 33.3 4.7 7,808 7,418
Case 4: No Suppres- Yes 26.3 3,228 3,228
sion or treatments No 30.2 6,936 2,472
Case 5: Public Yes 16.2
suppression and 28.5
private treatments 37.1
4 41.8 45.1 89.6 9,211 8,750
No 32.1
2 41.9 46.2 91.9 9,351 8,216
Case 6: Public Yes 40.5 99.9 9,164 7,604
suppression only No 45.6 105.5 9,331 7,570
24Figure 1: Wildﬁre probability distributions, with fuel management interventions (solid lines)
and without interventions (dotted lines). Interventions are shown to be applied at increasing
frequency as is optional when timber value grows over time.
25Figure 2: Substitution between the number of (conditionally optimal) fuel interventions and
the amount of suppression eﬀort. Case 1 (landowner not liable for D; optimal number of
treatments = 4).
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